Loneliness and the emotional experience of absence by Roberts, Tom & Krueger, Joel
Forthcoming in The Southern Journal of Philosophy 
 
1 
 
Loneliness and the emotional experience of absence 
Tom Roberts and Joel Krueger 
University of Exeter 
 
Abstract  
 
In this paper, we develop an analysis of the structure and content of loneliness. We 
argue that this is an emotion of absence – an affective state in which certain social goods 
are regarded as out of reach for the subject of experience. By surveying the range of 
social goods that appear to be missing from the lonely person’s perspective, we see 
what it is that can make this emotional condition so subjectively awful for those who 
undergo it, including the profound sense of being unable to realise oneself, in 
collaboration with others.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Many of our emotions arise in response to those external objects or events that bear 
significance for our projects and interests – our fear of a deadly snake; our anger at 
being insulted; the joy we feel when seeing a loved-one; and so forth. According to 
several mainstream theories of emotion, states such as fear, anger, and joy are 
intentionally directed at ordinary entities like these, whether in the form of an 
evaluative judgement (Nussbaum 2001; Solomon 1976) or construal (Roberts 2003); a 
world-oriented feeling (Goldie 2002); or as a perceptual or quasi-perceptual state 
(Prinz 2004). Intentional contents distinguish discrete emotions from one another and 
from moods, and make it the case that emotions are fitting in some situations and not 
in others (D’Arms & Jacobson 2000).  
 
Forthcoming in The Southern Journal of Philosophy 
 
2 
 
Some emotions, on the other hand, are responses to absences – for instance the surprise 
we experience when the car is not where we left it; our disappointment that it has not 
snowed overnight; or our frustration about the lack of good books at the library. And 
some emotions are essentially about what is missing, out of reach, or non-occurring. 
Grief, yearning, homesickness, unrequited love, and nostalgia, for example, are forms 
of (often painful) awareness of the absence of some object, person, or feature.1 Hope 
and anticipation are typically directed at events that have not yet occurred, or which 
may never occur.2 While the sensory perception of absence has received sustained 
attention in recent philosophical literature (e.g. Soteriou 2011; Farennikova 2013; 
Cavedon-Taylor 2017), the affective experience of absence has not.3 What is it for an 
emotion to be directed at the missing, the not-there, the didn’t-happen? 
 
In this paper, we give an analysis of loneliness as an emotion that essentially concerns 
absence.4 To anticipate, we hold that the experience of loneliness involves the feeling 
that certain social goods are missing and out of reach, either temporarily or 
permanently. The aims of the paper are twofold. Firstly, by highlighting the range and 
depth of the social goods that may be experienced as absent in this complex emotion, 
we gain a fuller understanding of the nature of loneliness and of the suffering that it 
can involve. Secondly, by using loneliness as an exemplar we can more clearly see 
 
1 For Gustafson (1989), for example, grief is essentially an emotional awareness of the loss of a loved-
one. For Fuchs (2018), grief is a gradual adjustment to this loss, during which the absent loved-one 
may retain an “as-if presence” in experience.  
2 See, for example, Martin (2011) for discussion of hopes that concern outcomes that have not yet 
happened.  
3 But see Roberts (2019) for an account of the experience of being emotionally unmoved by a situation; 
and Farennikova (2018) for an analysis of the evaluative perception of absence and examples of 
affective responses to absences. Cochrane’s (2018) control theory of emotions permits that losses may 
be salient in emotional experience, and that the subject’s capacity to restore those losses may make the 
difference between one emotion and another (p110).  
4 Despite the fact that loneliness is a near-universal experience, and is discussed extensively in 
literature, poetry, and religious texts, as well as empirical disciplines like sociology, psychology, and 
neuroscience, it has received surprisingly little attention from philosophers of emotion. Two 
exceptions in recent philosophy are Mijuskovic (2012), who treats loneliness as a universal, existential 
form of alienation from others; and Svendsen (2017), whose wide-ranging treatment of loneliness 
includes its historical, political, and sociological dimensions.  
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how emotions that take absences as their objects are structured. We begin in section 
one by introducing some examples of what we call emotions of absence and 
unpacking their general characteristics. In section two, we give an articulation of the 
content and character of the emotion of loneliness. In section three, we consider an 
objection to the account that arises from the experience of chronic loneliness and offer 
a response. In section four, we summarise our conclusions.  
 
1. Emotions of absence 
 
In the ordinary course of things, we face a great many absences that might come to 
our attention. Our local surroundings have one set of material constituents and 
qualities and not another; some objects and places are nearby and others are out of 
sight; our past contains the things we did and not the things we did not do; we 
ourselves have certain characteristics, both physical and mental, and lack others; and 
so on. Not all such absences enter our awareness, however; indeed, we are surely 
indifferent to most of them. What does it take, then, for an absence to become 
emotionally salient for an agent?  
 
In this section, we introduce a family of emotions of absence that have a two-part 
structure that we take to be characteristic of affective states of this class.5 The first 
element of each state is a pro-attitude towards some absent thing or quality; such as a 
desire for it, or an attitude of admiration, lust, or appreciation. The second element is 
a complex awareness that the absent thing cannot be made to be present; it cannot 
easily be achieved, generated, or brought about. This awareness has a package of 
cognitive, behavioural, and phenomenological symptoms, just as ordinary emotions 
do. The agent’s emotional awareness that some desired good is out of reach may show 
 
5 We focus here on absences of things towards which the subject has a pro-attitude, but leave open the 
possibility that there are emotions that track the absence of things that are negatively construed; such 
as the relief that something feared did not happen.   
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up in evaluative judgement, in embodied dispositions to act, and in the qualitative 
character of her subjective condition.6   
 
Consider the experience of homesickness, for example. This feeling involves a kind of 
longing – a desire for the comfort and familiarity of home – coupled with an awareness 
of how difficult it would be to realise this end. What is emotionally salient to the 
homesick individual is the distance that lies between her and home; whether this be 
literal, geographical distance, or a distance that concerns the physical or psychological 
labour that going home would require. The same two-part structure is evident in 
unrequited love, where a yearning for a romantic connection runs up against the 
recognition that this is not within one’s grasp.7 Unrequited love feels different from 
reciprocated love - at its core is the painful awareness that the object of your affection 
does not feel the same way about you, and that you are powerless to change this. The 
salient absence in this case is not of the person you love per se, but of loving attitudes 
and behaviour on their part; these are what you covet and experience as missing. 
Envy, too, can involve a similar tension, when it comprises a desire for some perceived 
good plus an awareness that you cannot have it. Although this latter aspect is perhaps 
inessential to the experience of envy, many of its most vivid manifestations do involve 
not only the pro-attitude, but a painful sense that its object is out of reach.8 And in 
many feelings of nostalgia, there is a sense that what one fondly remembers is long 
gone and cannot be recovered – “the very irretrievability of the past is salient in the 
 
6 Philosophers who have sought to characterise the essential nature of emotion have tended to 
privilege one or other of these symptoms – e.g. appraisal theories (e.g. Lazarus 1991); embodied 
theories (e.g. James 1884; Prinz 2004); feeling theories (e.g. Whiting 2011). Rather than enter this 
debate, we will remain neutral on the question of which of these features, if any, is necessary for an 
emotion to occur, and will treat emotions as multi-faceted psychological phenomena. 
7 Kolodny (2003: 171) describes unrequited love as an unfulfilled desire – or a “futile pining” – for a 
relationship with another. For an extended discussion of the nature and value of unrequited love, see 
Protasi (2016a).  
8 See Protasi (2016b: 539) on how envy can vary with the “perceived obtainability of the good” that is 
envied. “Inert envy is the result of being focused on the good but believing oneself to be incapable of 
getting the good for herself. Since she perceives (correctly) the good as unobtainable, the motivation 
to improve her situation is frustrated.”, p541.  
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experience” (Howard, 2012: 641, original emphasis).9 Lastly, feelings of shyness and 
social anxiety can involve a valuing of - or a sense of obligation towards - social 
interaction, plus a loss of confidence or power: it seems to you to be difficult or 
impossible to engage in small-talk, to maintain eye contact, and to respond to those 
around you in an easy, comfortable manner. The absence here, then, is something that 
is lacking from your own repertoire of interpersonal skills.  
 
Emotions like these each involve pro-attitudes towards some object, situation, 
property, or person, accompanied by an awareness of the perceived good’s being 
somehow beyond easy reach. This ‘awareness’ comes in a variety of forms. In some 
instances, it has a largely cognitive character. In nostalgia, for example, the 
irrecoverable nature of the past is presented most vividly in thought or judgement; 
which is why we tend to think of nostalgia as being an intellectual emotion.10 In other 
cases, the agent has a more significantly embodied, visceral awareness of how difficult 
it would be to obtain some end. The feelings of a loss of certainty and confidence that 
come with shyness, for instance, have a bodily character, wherein a core aspect of 
one’s affective state is an awareness of what one cannot do – namely, partake easily in 
social conduct.11 Elsewhere, the absence of what the agent desires, or the absence of 
the opportunity to pursue the good in question, is salient in perceptual experience. 
Part of the phenomenology of shyness, for instance, is that people look unreceptive or 
intimidating – their faces, body language, and so on do not solicit friendly engagement 
(part of feeling comfortable in a social situation, in contrast, is witnessing how others 
 
9 But see Sweeney (forthcoming) for a denial of Howard’s irretrievability thesis.  
10 Although nostalgia can harbour a bodily-affective component, too, such as when one feels a faint 
stirring, or is gripped by a more pronounced ache or yearning, for some past state of affairs.   
11 Compare this to Havi Carel’s (2013) account of bodily doubt – the debilitating loss of bodily 
conviction that comes with chronic pain or illness. One who suffers bodily doubt lacks certainty in 
actions of a physical and practical kind, and the world is transformed into a space of obstacles, tiring 
distances, and once-accessible affordances (e.g., stairs or hills that one used to easily climb) that are no 
longer within one’s reach. Feelings of shyness can be understood as a form of social doubt: a loss of 
confidence in oneself as a social agent, and in one’s abilities to smoothly act on a landscape of social 
affordances (e.g., smiles, friendly gestures, invitations to continue the conversation, etc.). 
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respond with warmth and attentiveness). In most cases, the subject's emotional 
awareness will have many or all of these psychological facets. One who endures 
unrequited love, for instance, may undergo a bittersweet process of evaluative 
appraisal, in which the object of affection is construed very positively, while the 
impossibility of romance is judged to be unbearable; bodily feelings of turmoil or 
anguish; and a sense of frustration or helplessness. The intensity of the emotion is, in 
each case, determined by how strongly the agent cares about the missing good. Mild 
or fleeting envy, say, comes about when I have a passing desire for something you 
possess; while a more pressing and encompassing form of this emotion will arise 
when I crave that thing with greater urgency.  
 
Emotions that concern what is absent and out of reach can, like other familiar affective 
episodes, give rise to additional psychological effects. A subject may be caused to feel 
daunted or de-motivated, for example, by the realisation that her goals will take great 
effort to achieve. Her plans for the future may be reconfigured, and her ambitions 
downgraded, when she suffers a loss of confidence in her own abilities. She may revise 
her sense of self-worth and rethink her relationships with others and her place in the 
world. And her attentional resources might be drawn, in thought and perception, to 
the object of her desire and to strategies to attain it. In sum, an individual’s awareness 
of the absence and unattainability of the things she desires, and the impact that this 
has upon her mental life – her feelings, judgements, and behavioural tendencies - can 
have complex emotional significance.  
 
Finally for this section, notice how first-person reports from phenomenological 
psychopathology can help further clarify the character of these kinds of experiences. 
In depressive episodes, for instance, individuals sometimes retain a sense of what it is 
like to connect with others but nevertheless feel unable to do so. One no longer feels 
drawn into interpersonal situations, or capable of smoothly adopting the embodied 
capacities needed to successfully negotiate everyday interactions. Depressed 
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individuals often describe not just an absence of interpersonal connection but also the 
feeling of absence, a felt need for something both present and, simultaneously, out of 
reach (Ratcliffe 2015: 219). Much of the pain of depression “arises out of the 
recognition that what might make me feel better—human connection—seems 
impossible in the midst of a paralyzing episode of depression” (Karp 1996: 16).     
 
2. Loneliness  
 
Before turning to how this two-part emotional structure is exhibited in loneliness and 
examining the content of the lonely person’s pro-attitudes, two sets of preliminary 
observations will be made. First, a note on terminology. “Lonely” is an adjective that 
can pick out either a subjective or an objective condition: it is possible for a person to 
live an objectively lonely existence – by which is meant a life that is unusually short 
on social contact – without thereby experiencing the undesirable emotional state of 
loneliness that is the focus of the current discussion. When construed as a subjective 
phenomenon, we take it that loneliness, like many emotions that endure over time 
such as romantic love, guilt, or grief, is a dispositional state that has occurrent 
manifestations. One can be lonely, that is, over a long period even though one does not 
undergo conscious feelings of loneliness at each and every moment. To be lonely in 
this sense is to be disposed to have experiences of the kind to be analysed in what 
follows – to have a tendency towards bouts or pangs of loneliness that possess the 
complex structure outlined below.12  
  
Second, we briefly rehearse the variety of circumstances that may give rise to feelings 
of loneliness, and to which any analysis of this emotion must do justice.13 A person 
can feel lonely, most obviously, when she finds herself substantially detached from 
 
12 For a detailed taxonomy of affective states, see Deonna & Teroni (2009, 2012).  
13 Svendsen (2017, chapter 3) and Ben Ze’ev (2000: 470) make similar observations about the diversity 
of situations in which loneliness may occur.  
Forthcoming in The Southern Journal of Philosophy 
 
8 
 
other people; for example when she is geographically secluded, or unable to leave her 
home for a long period. Loneliness can be a response to isolation from particular 
persons, such as one’s family or one’s accustomed social circle, or from a populace at 
large, when one feels more generally alienated or misunderstood. A person can be 
lonely even while they are surrounded by others – in a crowded city, say, or in the 
workplace. And there are many kinds of individual interpersonal relationship in 
which one might participate whilst at the same time feeling profoundly lonely, such 
as those involved in caring for small children or for a patient with dementia. These 
commonplace facts support the intuitive idea that what matters in loneliness is the 
absence not of human interaction simpliciter, but of distinctive kinds of social 
connection. Purely professional dealings; encounters that have a very formal 
structure; or exchanges that are short-lived and impersonal all seem to offer little 
respite from loneliness.  
 
We propose that what the lonely person fundamentally cares about is the 
unattainability of certain richer social goods, such as companionship; moral support; 
physical contact and affection; sympathy; trust; romance; friendship; and the 
opportunity to act and interact – and so to flourish – as a social agent.14 This spectrum 
of goods underpins, reinforces, and sustains many of our most valued human 
relationships, and so unpacking them in detail enables us to see what is at stake in 
loneliness; why this emotion can bear such significance for a person’s wellbeing. 
Although many lonely episodes involve a relatively fleeting, sometimes 
inconsequential yearning for the everyday rewards of social transaction, there are 
deeper interpersonal goods at issue here too. Being intellectually and emotionally 
supported by others; receiving reassurance, validation, and love; and being able to 
 
14 As we will see in more detail in section 2.2 below, this enables us to distinguish between a person 
who is lonely and one who is solitary: the latter is one for whom social goods like these do not hold so 
much allure; one who has confidence in her own independence, for instance, and does not crave the 
attention and involvement of others in her affairs.  
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express and cultivate those aspects of one’s identity that have an essentially social 
form. 
 
2.1. Social goods 
 
When things are going well, our social contact with others yields many familiar 
benefits. Firstly, there are the everyday goods of pleasure and utility that can emerge 
between even quite casual acquaintances, such as light-hearted conversation, shared 
jokes, and practical assistance. There are those with whom you have something in 
common, and with whom you can enjoy a hobby or pastime together; and there are 
those who enliven mundane tasks like working or traveling. The primary value of 
these relationships comes from the small-scale ways in which they improve one’s 
daily existence; and they do not require intimacy or investment – colleagues or 
neighbours can provide these goods.15  
 
Closer relationships afford more substantial emotional and personal rewards. Friends 
and partners partake in a reciprocal “attitude of optimism about the other person’s 
goodwill” (Jones 1996:6) – an expectation that the other will offer encouragement and 
support, for example, in times of hardship; will give proper thought to one’s 
suggestions and schemes; will respect one’s point of view; and will forgive one’s 
misdemeanours.16 Relationships like these can alleviate cognitive and affective 
burdens, for instance by offering a judgement-free setting in which one can vent 
stresses and fears, or a supportive space in which ideas can be vetted.17 Sharing 
 
15 Aristotle (NE: book VIII; EE: book VII) defines friendships of pleasure and utility in similar terms.  
16 Even in the closest friendships, this goodwill is not boundless. There is no expectation that one’s 
friend will forgive grave moral transgressions, for instance. See Koltonski (2016) for a discussion of 
the idea that good friends are those who would help you move a body. For Aristotle (NE: book VIII), 
virtue-based philia – friendship that is grounded in the mutual pursuit of moral excellence – must be 
abandoned when one party falls short of virtue and cannot be reformed (for discussion see, e.g., 
McCoy 2013).  
17 See Tsai (2018) for an account of supportiveness as a virtue. 
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anxieties, thwarted ambitions, grudges, complaints, and so forth can help to 
contextualise them and keep them in proportion; and there is a therapeutic advantage 
to the disclosure of painful memories, guilty feelings, or destructive patterns of 
thought. A cognitive load, meanwhile, is lifted when solutions to problems are 
crystallised in dialogue with others, when your friend remembers something so you 
don’t have to, and so on. These ‘goods of friendship’ further enhance one’s quality of 
life, reducing the effort, anxiety, and frustration that can come with having to face the 
world on one’s own. And people like these contribute to one’s self-esteem – their 
praise (their flattery; their gratitude etc.) is adopted as a sincere expression of 
goodwill, and so can make one feel better about oneself and one’s achievements. 
Similarly, the presence of those who are manifestly delighted to see you, and who take 
a keen interest in what you have to say - being recognised as a person of value, whose 
perspective is to be taken seriously - enhances this fundamental sense of self-worth.  
 
Those to whom we are close, moreover, contribute over time to who we are, by 
helping to shape, refine and acknowledge our point of view.18 The complexity and 
nuance of one’s outlook on the world is developed in collaboration with others – those 
intimate associates who open one’s eyes to new experiences, and whose contrasting 
ideas and judgements force one to defend or revise one’s own tastes and opinions. The 
breadth and diversity of one’s interests; the subtlety of one’s aesthetic sensibilities; the 
passion with which one holds one’s political convictions – all of these owe much to 
the company one keeps. And friends and partners improve our knowledge of 
ourselves, whether by holding up a ‘mirror’ through which we see our own qualities 
 
18 They have, as Nehamas (2010: 288) has put it, “a privileged role in [the] lifelong process of self-
construction”; and friendship “provides… a place where one can try, not necessarily consciously, new 
ways of being – of acting, feeling and thinking” (p289). For more on the relation between friendship 
and the self, see Cocking & Kennett (1998).  
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in someone else; via an explicit process of self-interpretation; or simply by way of 
shared experience.19  
 
Lastly, social situations provide the context in which individual traits of character can 
be manifested; including those traits that matter deeply to the agent’s conception of 
herself. Just as a sporting context can make possible the virtues of teamwork, and a 
professional context can make possible the virtues of leadership, say, so it is within an 
interpersonal context that particular aspects of one’s personality can flourish. In 
company, you can be honest, vulnerable, witty, and kind in ways that are impossible 
on your own. With friends and family, you can be mischievous, irreverent, indiscreet, 
and spontaneous. With an intimate partner, you can be romantic, affectionate, 
passionate, and loyal. You can be a sympathetic listener; a storyteller; a giver of 
thoughtful gifts and wise counsel; or the life and soul of the party. Traits like these can 
be central to a person’s idea of themselves; they are elements of one’s character in 
which one may have a deep investment, and of which one may be justly proud. 
Moreover, they can give the bearer a sense of purpose – taking on a nurturing role, or 
the position of confidante or advisor, for example, brings responsibilities that make 
one feel valued and trusted.  
 
Consider, then, what is absent from the life of a person who lacks full access to this 
spectrum of social goods, perhaps because she leads an unusually isolated existence. 
A loss of access to simple goods of pleasure and utility – having nobody to rely on for 
small favours, for conversation, or for company during everyday pursuits - is itself 
detrimental to her quality of life. A lack of social pleasures to enjoy or look forward 
to, a lack of physical affection, shared amusement, and carefree interaction all 
compound this condition. In the absence of persons with whom one can be relaxed 
and socially comfortable, one’s exchanges with others are apt to be formal and 
 
19 For the mirroring account, see Aristotle (EE: VII. xii. 1245a.); for discussion see, e.g., Biss (2011), Hitz 
(2011). 
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perfunctory, or worse – awkward and self-conscious. Without more intimate 
companionship, what is missing bears greater significance for one’s self-conception 
and self-regard: there is nobody to endorse one’s judgement, nor to offer advice, 
praise, or condolence; there are fewer opportunities to have one’s ego boosted, as there 
is nobody to validate one’s successes, applaud one’s insight, appreciate one’s warmth, 
or recognise one’s talent. One is unable to fully express one’s character – there is little 
room for the frivolous, the impromptu, the tongue-in-cheek; or for sympathy, 
compassion, and camaraderie.  
 
2.2 Loneliness and the perceived absence of social goods 
 
The lonely person’s pro-attitudes are directed towards this spectrum of social goods. 
Most of us share this overarching, very human concern – we take pleasure in the 
company of others; invest in forming and maintaining close attachments to people; 
and value the bonds of trust, understanding, and intimacy that arise within loving 
relationships. Different individuals care more about particular aspects of 
interpersonal engagement than others, of course: some people value emotional 
intimacy, others put a premium on physical affection; some people desire intellectual 
stimulation, others seek laughter and the low-brow. Some people crave attention and 
validation, some are seeking a romantic or sexual partner, others desire direction and 
motivation from trusted associates. And a person’s social pro-attitudes are 
idiosyncratic and partial: they concern specific persons and groups, and the peculiar 
benefits that accrue from relations with these people. I want my family’s guidance; 
you hunger for his touch; he desires their reassurance. These attitudes fluctuate in 
intensity over time, as we grow and mature, as our luck changes, as we relocate, as 
we marry and have children, and so forth.  
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It is the absence and unattainability of goods of these sorts that become salient in the 
complex emotional psychology of loneliness.20 They come to attention in world-
directed cognitive attitudes and perceptual states, and in the self-directed experience 
of one’s own body and its powers, to give the agent the felt impression that certain 
desirable social goods are inaccessible. 
 
Consider for example how this experience of loneliness might manifest itself even 
whilst one is surrounded by other people, when one is struggling to integrate with 
them. A crowd can fail to perceptually afford easy, comfortable social engagement, 
nor to invite anything more than a formal level of social contact. For instance, others’ 
attitudes may be regarded as disinterested and passive, showing only minimal 
engagement with one’s attempted interventions. The body language of such people 
may be experienced as closed, and there may be a visible absence of social signals of 
goodwill and rapport, such as sustained eye-contact, smiles, and expressions of 
encouragement. In an unfamiliar community, one may witness social protocols that 
are foreign – norms of behavioural etiquette that one doesn’t know how to navigate. 
Others may react with surprise, suspicion, or hostility to one’s clumsy or uncertain 
attempts at ingratiation; the social environment thus appears not to be receptive to 
one’s social overtures. One’s own bodily comportment can come to conscious 
attention here, too. It may show up in feelings of hesitancy, timidity, or diffidence, 
where one finds oneself unable to formulate the right language or behaviour to initiate 
and maintain a connection with others. In the absence of perceived social cues, one 
may be aware that certain utterances (questions, jokes, conversational turns) or actions 
(gestures, facial expressions, touches) that form part of one’s natural repertoire of 
friendly communication are contextually inappropriate. And one may feel a degree of 
 
20 Mijuskovic (2015) holds that loneliness is a necessary, inescapable aspect of the human condition; in 
which case this ‘unattainability’ will be absolute. We do not share this pessimism. It is possible, we 
attest, to connect in meaningful ways with those in our social orbit, and to participate in the rewards 
afforded by these connections.  
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bodily awkwardness or lack of fluency while attempting to follow a community’s 
unfamiliar social codes. Notice that these are lonely feelings that arise while one is in 
the company of others. What one feels is that social participation with those present 
is difficult or impossible to attain, and when one is systematically powerless to remedy 
this then one’s loneliness may incorporate painful feelings of exclusion and alienation 
- entry into the social world is perceived as requiring considerable effort. 
 
One’s lack of access to social goods can also become salient in cognitive attitudes. For 
example, when one entertains happy memories of periods when those goods were 
abundant, and this throws their current absence into stark relief. When the sadness 
that one feels at the passing of those times (the best days spent with friends in 
adolescence, for instance) is not only a wistful sense of their irrecoverability, but a 
painful awareness that one will never be as happy again, the distress of loneliness 
goes further than ordinary nostalgia.21 What is conspicuous is the gulf between the 
social goods one enjoyed in the past and those to which one has access in the present. 
The experience is one of a loss of such access; a recognition of goods that are no longer 
attainable. When one thinks of times to come, what becomes salient is a narrowing of 
the space of possible opportunities for social engagement and its benefits – the days 
and years ahead do not appear crowded with social occasions and rich with 
companionship. Instead, the future seems to offer only an impoverished and isolated 
path that, although perhaps punctuated by visits and phone calls, is largely devoid of 
interpersonal contact. A widow or widower, for example, may be forced to 
contemplate a future life that has lost its familiar texture and is now empty of all that 
was once shared with their partner.22 The absence may be an inescapable focus of 
 
21 We do not intend to suggest that the distinction between loneliness and nostalgia – or between the 
pains involved in each - is always clear. For example, Gotlib (2017: 183) emphasises “the kind of 
nostalgia [that] is grounded in deeper losses: the losses of home, of community, of culture, of 
language, and sometimes of self... a kind of sadness that can be damaging not only to moral agency, 
but also to one’s identity”. This is to align the losses experienced in nostalgia to those we have 
emphasised in this paper.  
22 For a detailed narrative account of grief, see Goldie (2011).  
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attention and rumination; something that cannot be ignored for long, and which must 
be continually confronted throughout the ordinary course of deliberation and 
decision-making.  
 
The experience of being unable to access social goods has a self-directed component, 
concerning what one can and must do. One can be aware of limitations to one’s 
dispositions and powers as a social agent, and one can be aware of the degree of 
responsibility one must take for oneself, in situations where one has no collaborators. 
As outlined above, it is a consequence of social isolation that one cannot fully be 
oneself, and that traits of character cannot flourish as they would in more richly 
interpersonal contexts. One cannot easily be affectionate, say, or vulnerable; there is 
little room for wit and a sense of fun to find an outlet; one’s strange enthusiasms must 
be kept under wraps; and one may be forced to conceal or restrain the side of one’s 
character that would otherwise find its fullest expression within a social group. This 
too is a condition that can come to one’s attention, as a manifestation of loneliness. 
Firstly, one may feel constrained and inhibited during one’s dealings with unfamiliar 
others: unable to express oneself as one would like to, for example, and bound by 
restrictions of decorum. One may feel that one cannot express warmth or sympathy – 
that it is not one’s place to intervene in the affairs of a person one doesn’t know well - 
and frustrated by the conventional, formulaic interactions one must undergo with 
strangers. More deeply, one may experience an attenuation of one’s identity, akin to 
what one might feel at the loss of a job, for example: a lack of purpose and usefulness, 
a sense that one has no valuable role to play in the lives of others.23 If there is nobody 
who shares one’s religious, political, or moral outlook, then one might feel 
marginalised and under pressure not to voice and enact one’s convictions. If there is 
nobody with whom to enjoy a favourite pastime, then one may feel unable to maintain 
one’s identity as, say, a sports fan, choral singer, or theatregoer. Specific strands of 
 
23 See Ratcliffe (2013: 602) for a discussion of this type of case. 
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one’s social identity are experienced as invisible to others – they have no outlet - and 
one’s loneliness concerns the ways in which isolation from like-minded individuals 
has left one diminished.24  
 
In the absence of social relationships, moreover, one may be struck by the extent to 
which one must rely upon, and take responsibility for, oneself alone. In simple 
contexts, this can include the recognition that one must choose how to spend one’s 
time from day to day; what to eat; how to amuse oneself; and so on. When undertaking 
decisions and judgements of greater importance, one acknowledges that one must 
determine what course of life to pursue, and which stance to take on matters of value. 
This is psychological labour that is often performed in collaboration with trusted 
associates whose judgement we trust and with whom we pursue joint projects and 
collective decision-making. Bereft of their encouragement and support, one might feel 
daunted or overwhelmed by the task ahead: that of shaping and maintaining one’s 
perspective on the world, of regulating one’s emotional condition, and of taking 
ownership of one’s actions. With prolonged withdrawal from the social domain, one 
has the time and opportunity to ruminate upon one’s failures, to second-guess one’s 
choices, and to worry about things to come. One’s loneliness may thus manifest itself 
in feelings of self-consciousness and self-doubt: a loss of confidence and certainty in 
one’s ability to realise defining ambitions.  
 
These considerations indicate the complexity of the multi-faceted experience of 
loneliness, and explain why this emotional condition can be so subjectively awful for 
those who suffer from it. Episodes of loneliness that involve feelings of a lack of power 
to express oneself, for example, or those involve a sense of exclusion and alienation 
from the society in which one lives; loneliness that incorporates a sense of being 
daunted or weighed-down by the responsibility that one must take your oneself, or a 
 
24 We find a similar lesson in Svendsen (2017: 136): “Without some attachment to others, you are an 
inferior version of yourself, simply because central parts of yourself remain fallow”.  
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sense that future opportunities for social pleasures are permanently closed to one; 
loneliness that presents the world as hostile to one’s interpersonal aspirations, or as 
lacking opportunities for intimacy and rapport: all of these can tap into an individual’s 
most profound concerns. They are experiences whose subjective unpleasantness is 
determined by how painful it is to crave certain basic human needs and see no hope 
of them being fulfilled.  
 
With a positive account of how a lonely person is disposed to feel now on the table, 
we can see how to mark with clarity the distinction between loneliness and solitude, 
where the latter is construed as a positive or painless emotional attitude towards being 
apart from others – the state that is enjoyed, for example, when one takes a long walk 
in the countryside; when one retreats to a private space after a long day at work; or 
when one sneaks a break from a busy family occasion.25 Loneliness, we have argued, 
requires that the subject of experience has a particular suite of pro-attitudes towards 
the social: that she desires, craves, or yearns for interpersonal contact and the 
pleasures and benefits it affords. Only then will the felt impression that these goods 
cannot be achieved be of emotional significance for her, and only then will her own 
social powerlessness and diminished identity appear as a source of distress. It is 
natural to think of the subject of solitude as lacking the relevant pro-attitudes towards 
social participation, whether temporarily or as an enduring trait of character. One who 
enjoys a brief respite from the demands of interpersonal engagement, for instance, has 
exhausted her reserves of goodwill and has little appetite for the company of others, 
at least for a while. More permanently, someone who has an overarching preference 
for her own company – or a systematic misanthropy – will have little need for practical 
or emotional input from others, and will not tend to regard interpersonal relationships 
as especially desirable. Likewise, someone who is supremely comfortable in their own 
skin, and who has no craving for social validation and reassurance, will not feel as 
 
25 For discussion of possible benefits of solitude, construed as a positive form of loneliness, see 
Svendsen (2017, chapter 7).  
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though much is missing from the solitary life and may consider others to be a 
distraction or burden. This gives credence to Aristotle’s remark that the hyper-solitary 
agent who is “so self-sufficient as not to need to... partake of society, is either a beast or 
a god”.26 Consider the spectrum of social goods for which a person who is never prone 
to feel lonely does not care: the warmth, good-humour, sympathy, and 
encouragement of others; the chance to express, discuss, and reflect upon deeply-held 
convictions; the shaping of individual and shared attitudes and the pursuit of joint 
projects; the giving and receiving of physical affection; and past and future times that 
were, or could be, enriched by the company of others. A person with so little concern 
for these goods that she never yearns for them when they are absent may be justly 
accused – qua beast – of a lack of humanity, compassion, or respect for others. If she is 
consistently indifferent to social goods because she finds them trivial in comparison 
to her own, loftier concerns then she has – qua god – transcended the everyday 
personal domain. A capacity for loneliness, then, is a distinctively human trait that 
reflects the value we place on the bonds and benefits of interpersonal relationships. It 
arises when our social needs are not met – when the intimacy, affection, or validation 
towards which we are positively oriented remains painfully out of reach, and the 
extent to which our individual flourishing is dependent upon the social world we 
inhabit is exposed.  
 
3. Chronic loneliness 
 
Next, it will be instructive to consider a problem case for our account of loneliness. 
Our model of emotions of absence entails that the subject has a pro-attitude, or 
combination of pro-attitudes, towards some missing or inaccessible thing; in 
loneliness, the various social goods we have described above. But we can well imagine 
a person who has been lonely for so long that she no longer feels any desire for social 
 
26 Politics, book I part II.  
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interaction – she is resigned to spending her time by herself, and no craving for 
intimacy or yearning for lost companionship ever arises in her consciousness. In this 
type of case, one half of the two-part structure that we have indicated is characteristic 
of loneliness is missing. But we would hesitate to say that this person is not lonely, 
and we would be more strongly disinclined to say that her loss of socially-oriented 
desires has somehow cured her loneliness. If we are to maintain that this individual 
remains a victim of chronic loneliness, how can this be reconciled with the frustrated-
pro-attitude account developed in this paper? 
 
Two preliminary observations are in order before we turn to our response to this 
challenge. Firstly, depending on how the details of the scenario are conceived, it may 
be appropriate to attribute solitude rather than loneliness to the subject – that is, it 
may be that she has come to terms with a solitary lifestyle, and that she is broadly 
content with her socially isolated situation. In such a case, it is not so problematic to 
think that her loneliness has been ameliorated or even cured over time. The pro-
attitudes that used to drive her lonely feelings have receded, and she no longer has a 
negatively-valenced awareness of frustrated goals and missing goods. So, we need to 
exercise caution in attributing loneliness to a person in hypotheticals like these. 
Secondly, recall that a person’s objective status might intelligibly be described as 
“lonely” – when, for example, she is consistently alone – without this entailing that 
she feels lonely. So, it may be that it is the objective situation of the chronically lonely 
person that is best described as lonely, with no implication for the subjective character 
of her emotional state.  
 
With these observations in mind, let us reiterate the range of pro-attitudes that is 
hypothesised to be missing in the case at hand. It can be stipulated that the agent has 
no yearning for company, no wish to talk to others, no desire for practical or moral 
support, no felt need to express her sociable side, no wistful longing for lost 
friendship, and no joyful anticipation of future social goods. We posit that a systematic 
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absence of occurrent desires of these sorts reveals an underlying lack of concern for 
social goods, and that this lack of concern transforms how the social world is 
experienced in chronic loneliness: it yields an affective flattening in which people and 
situations lose their social significance for the subject. This transformation has an 
impact both upon how the agent perceives the world around her, and how she 
experiences her own embodied condition. A person for whom the goods of social 
interaction have lost their allure will, for instance, not be motivated to pursue the 
range of everyday social activities in which we usually participate. She will feel no 
urge to enter into conversation or otherwise comport herself as an approachable and 
receptive social agent, and she will be less attuned to social affordances like facial 
expressions, gestures, and intonation patterns that animate social interaction. Her 
“bodily-affective style” (Colombetti & Krueger 2015; Maiese 2016), as we might refer 
to it – i.e., her habitual ways of moving, expressing herself, and engaging with the 
social world – is subdued, undemonstrative, and closed to others. In making plans 
and surveying the future, new and complex social ventures (perhaps even leaving the 
house) will not arise as salient options – they will not emerge within the space of 
credible possibilities for action. She will not attend to social goods in thought and 
memory, nor hope to be the recipient of others’ good will.27 And she will no longer 
expect to be able to express herself as a social agent, nor to adopt those interpersonal 
roles that once meant so much to her – she will not aspire to be the nurturing friend, 
the shoulder to cry on, the confidante, and so forth. In sum, chronic loneliness may 
result in a narrowing of the subject’s horizons as a social agent, and an attenuation to 
her affective responsiveness to the social world. This flattened affective condition, we 
suggest, just is the way in which loneliness manifests itself when the subject has lost 
all interest in the spectrum of social goods towards which we are usually positively 
oriented. It is, in this respect, like the emotional state of joylessness, hopelessness, or 
 
27 For an account of what it is to lose hope, see Ratcliffe (2013). 
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indifference: defined not by a negatively-valenced qualitative character of its own, but 
by diminished feeling, motivation, and attentiveness.  
 
We can compare this to the more generalised affective flattening described in reports 
of the phenomenology of psychiatric conditions such as depression (e.g. Fuchs 2013, 
Ratcliffe 2015). Social difficulties and emotional disturbances in disorders like 
schizophrenia and depression have received increased attention within the 
philosophy of psychiatry literature in recent years, particularly in phenomenological 
psychopathology.28 However, within this literature, the felt loneliness that often arises 
from these social difficulties has not been given a separate treatment – despite the fact 
that a characterization of the latter is not, in itself, sufficient to understand the 
structure and content of the former. In future work, we intend to apply this analysis 
of loneliness to a consideration of psychiatric disorders and explore its potential 
clinical and therapeutic significance. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This paper has proposed an analysis of the emotional condition of loneliness. The 
lonely person, we have argued, is one for whom certain distinctive and desirable 
social goods seem to be inaccessible or hard to attain, either because the environment 
appears not to afford them, or because her own social powers feel inadequate to the 
task. The goods that may strike the lonely person as out of reach include the quotidian 
benefits that arise between casual friends and colleagues, such as the small pleasures 
derived from company and conversation. More substantially, they include the 
support and insight of trusted associates; the intimacy and physical affection that 
accrues within romantic partnerships; and the care and consideration we enjoy from 
family members. And because there are traits of one’s own personality that find their 
 
28 See, e.g., Krueger 2018; Krueger and Colombetti 2018; Ratcliffe 2015; Van Duppen 2017. 
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expression exclusively in interpersonal contexts, and meaningful roles that can only 
be played when others are around, a lonely person may feel unable to act out 
meaningful dimensions of their character and so to realise themselves fully as social 
agents.  
 
Lastly, we considered the emotional condition of a person whose chronic loneliness 
has extinguished the social pro-attitudes that usually drive the experience of this 
emotion; who no longer cares for, or is motivated to achieve, the goods of 
companionship and intimacy, and who no longer aspires to express herself as a social 
agent. Here, the individual’s emotional state is characterised by a widespread internal 
loss or attenuation: an affective devitalisation, within which the social world has lost 
its allure.29  
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